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OFFICER AND SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA:
UNITED STATES v. NORTHEASTERN
PHARMACEUTICAL AND CHEMICAL
CO., INC.,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)
The problem of abandoned toxic waste dumps is a tragedy of devas-
tating proportions.' Federal efforts to remedy this potentially cata-
strophic situation culminated in the passage of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA).2 The liability provision of the Act imposes cleanup costs
incurred by state and federal authorities on responsible "persons." 3
Although the term "person" encompasses both individuals and corpo-
1. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120, contains congressional findings and discus-
sion regarding the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA) [hereinafter CERCLA Report].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9674 (1982 & Supp. 1986). The history of the Act notes Con-
gress' intention to close a loophole created by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (also known as the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, or RCRA). RCRA seeks to provide a "cradle-to-grave regulatory
regime governing the movement of hazardous waste in our society. Since enactment of
that law, a major new source of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic conse-
quences of improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices
known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem.'" CERCLA Report, supra note
1, at 6120. Thus, while RCRA applies prospectively to currently produced and stored
toxic wastes, CERCLA operates retrospectively to govern those wastes disposed of and
abandoned. Id.
3. CERCLA authorizes the President to enter into agreements with state and local
authorities to effect cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d) (1982). The liability provisions of
§ 9607(a) provide:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, . . . (1) the owner and operator
of... a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous wastes were
disposed of, (3) any person who... arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged
with a transporter for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances . . ., and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal facilities... from which there is a release, or a threatened release... shall
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rations, courts continue to struggle with the individual liability of cor-
porate officers and owners who incur CERCLA liability while acting
within the scope of their employment.' In United States v. Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit imposed personal CERCLA liability on a
corporate officer involved in toxic dumping.6
John W. Lee supervised the operation of Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal's (NEPACCO) disinfectant manufacturing plan in Verona, Mis-
souri.7 Lee was a shareholder and vice-president of NEPACCO.' The
plant's operations produced several toxic by-products, including di-
oxin.9 In 1971, Lee approved the burial of eighty-five 55-gallon drums
be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or State ....
The Act further defines "person" at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21): "The term 'person' means an
individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, com-
mercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." See infra note 42 for the CERCLA
definitions of "owner or operator" and "facility."
4. See supra note 3; see also United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 186, 187 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
5. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
6. 810 F.2d at 744.
7. Lee defended this action with NEPACCO and two other employees. One de-
fendant was Mills, a former shift supervisor at the plant, and the individual who actu-
ally "dumped" the waste. Michaels, the founder and former president of NEPACCO
and the corporation's largest shareholder, was the other individual defendant. Id. at
745.
8. Id. at 729.
9. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A), designates
dioxin, or 2,3,7,8-tetrachiorodibenzo-p-dioxin, a hazardous substance under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). List of Hazardous Substances and Reportable Quanti-
ties, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (table) (1986).
The Northeastern Pharmaceutical trial court discussed the toxic nature of dioxin in its
findings:
[T]o date, dioxin has produced teratogenic, mutagenic, fetotoxic, and carcinogenic
results in low dose levels in various laboratory animals.... [D]ioxin is particularly
devastating to specific organs of laboratory animals and human beings; e.g., liver,
kidneys, intestines, nervous system, reproductive, and skin. Dioxin is persistent in
the environment and is bio-accumulative in the tissues... of plants and animals
.... [Tihere is presently no known safe level of dioxin in the environment ....
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 832
(W.D. Mo. 1984).
NEPACCO manufactured hexachlorophene, a disinfectant. Manufacture of hexa-
chiorophene entailed the initial production of TCP, which was then refined into the end
product. The early stages of distilling the TCP produced a residue called still bottoms,
characterized as a "dark oily sludge." Id. at 828, 829. The hazardous waste took a
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containing dioxin at a local farm."° Nine years later, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) investigated the dumping site," stabi-
lized the affected area, and filed suit against both NEPACCO and Lee
for recovery of the cleanup costs.1" The district court agreed with the
EPA that CERCLA imposes liability on any individual who makes
decisions regarding toxic waste disposal. 3 The Eighth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that Lee's personal activity with NEPACCO, not his
status as a corporate officer and shareholder, rendered him liable.14
The common law provides two means of holding corporate owners
and officers liable for the torts of their corporation. First, a court may
"pierce the corporate veil"1" upon a showing that the corporation is
variety of forms, including the sludge of the still bottoms, clay from the refining and
filtering process, and waste water. Besides containing other chemicals of varying levels
of toxicity, the court noted that each residue probably contained dangerous quantities of
dioxin as well. Id.
10. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 1986). The court de-
scribes the participation of the other defendants:
In July 1971 Mills approached NEPACCO plant manager Bill Ray with a pro-
posal to dispose of the waste-filled 55-gallon drums on a farm owned by James
Denney located about seven miles south of Verona. Ray visited the Denney farm
and discussed the proposal with Lee; Lee approved the use of Mills' services and
the Denney farm as a disposal site. In mid-July 1971 Mills and Gerald Lechner
dumped approximately 85 of the 55-gallon drums into a large trench on the Den-
ney farm... that had been excavated by Leon Vaughn. Vaughn then filled in the
trench. Only NEPACCO drums were disposed of at the Denney farm site.
Id.
11. The EPA reacted to an anonymous tip that NEPACCO buried waste on James
Denney's farm. An EPA investigation revealed that the site was not suitable for waste
disposal. The EPA took samples from the barrels, the local well water, and the soil
beneath the drums. Under contract with the EPA, a private firm began a feasibility
study of site cleanup. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 831.
12. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 730. CERCLA provides that "'re-
spond' or 'response' means remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, all such
terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activi-
ties related thereto." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (Supp. IV 1986). Thus, response costs are
those incurred in responding to or remedying a hazardous situation.
13. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 847, 848.
14. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744.
15. Courts disregard the artificial nature of the entity and "pierce the corporate
veil" to impose liability on corporate owners. The conflicting concepts are the idea of
corporate individuality, or "personality," and the circumstances giving rise to liability.
See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 146 (3d ed. 1983),
(citing, United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1905)). Milwaukee illustrates a court's capacity to ignore a corporation's personality:
If any general rule be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a
corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until suffi-
1988]
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"less than a bona fide entity."' 16 This rule renders shareholders liable
for actions of the corporation, contingent upon a showing that the cor-
porate entity exists primarily to divert liability from the shareholders. 17
The second form of liability, "corporate actor" liability, 8 stems from
the direct involvement of the officer or stockholder in the acts resulting
in corporate liability.' 9 Thus, when a corporate officer or owner partic-
ipates in behavior rendering the corporation liable,20 a court may find
both the corporation and the individual officer liable. 21 Corporate ac-
tor liability differs from piercing the corporate veil because the latter
cient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law
will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
Milwaukee Refrigerator, 142 F. at 255. Thus, a court may disregard the corporate form
when there is reason to believe the corporation is "less than a bona fide entity." See
Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978).
The court in Ramsay v. Adams, 4 Kan. App. 2d 184, 603 P.2d 1025 (1979), suggested
eight factors which may serve as grounds for "piercing the corporate veil":
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation, (2) failure to observe corpo-
rate formalities, (3) non-payment of dividends, (4) siphoning of corporate funds by
a dominant stockholder, (5) non-functioning of other officers or directors, (6) ab-
sence of corporate records, (7) use of the corporation as a facade for operation of a
dominant stockholder or stockholders, and (8) use of the corporation in promoting
injustice or fraud.
Id. at 186-87, 603 P.2d at 1028.
16. Donsco, 587 F.2d at 606.
17. See supra note 15 for a list of specific grounds for piercing the corporate veil.
18. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit used the "corporate
actor" liability rule in Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978). The
court applied this rule against a corporate officer defendant. The case involved the de-
fendant's pirating of plaintiff's advertising scheme, or "trade dress." The court affirmed
the district court's decision holding both the defendant corporation and the defendant
officer liable. The Third Circuit found the acts of the defendants unfair because they
tended to confuse customers and copywriters. Id. at 603. The court noted that the
officer "authorized and approved the acts of unfair competition which [were] the basis
of Casper Corporation's liability." Id. at 606. Finding the personal participation in the
wrongful act to be the sole determinative factor, the court held the officer's assertion of
corporate status immaterial to his defense. Id
19. Id. at 606; see also 3A FLANAGAN & KEATING, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1135 and 1137 (Perm. ed. 1986) (statement
of the corporate actor liability rule and extensive discussion of its permutations).
20. Donsco, 587 F.2d at 606.
21. Id. Fletcher notes: "The fact that the circumstances are such as to render the
corporation liable is altogether immaterial. The injured person may hold either [the
corporation or its officer] liable, and generally the injured person may hold both as joint
tort-feasors." 3A FLETCHER, § 1135, at 267.
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holds only a specific officer liable,"2 without requiring additional proof
that the corporation lacks integrity.23 In determining corporate officer
liability under CERCLA, some courts employ the corporate actor the-
ory rather than the veil piercing theory.24
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA to address the problems posed
by abandoned and inactive toxic waste dumps.2" The Act authorizes
the government, through the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), to initiate immediately response procedures26 when an actual
or potential release of hazardous substances threatens the environ-
ment.2 7 Response costs derive from the "Superfund,"" 8 an environ-
22. Id.
It is thoroughly well settled that a person is personally liable for all torts commit-
ted by him . .. notwithstanding he may have acted as the agent or under the
directions of another. And this is true to the full extent as to torts committed by
the officers of agents of a corporation in the management of its affairs.
IdL
23. See supra note 15. Additionally, the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff
to establish the grounds for piercing the veil. See Ramsay v. Adams, 4 Kan. App. 2d
184, 187, 603 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1979).
24. Donsco, 587 F.2d at 606.
25. CERCLA Report, supra note 1, at 6119-20. The court in United States v. Price,
577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983), commented on CERCLA's convoluted legislative his-
tory. The court describes the haste with which Congress enacted the legislation, criti-
cizing the package as "inadequately drafted." Id at 1109. The court concluded that
"[b]ecause of the haste with which CERCLA was enacted, Congress was not able to
provide a clarifying committee report, thereby making it extremely difficult to pin-point
the intended scope of the legislation." Id Lack of clear legislative direction under-
scores the courts' difficulty in applying the liability provisions of CERCLA to corporate
officers and actors. See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1 (1982).
In United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982), the
court commented on the hurried consideration CERCLA received before Congress, and
concluded that "the Committee Reports should be read with caution." Id. at 1111.
The court noted two principal congressional concerns: 1) The EPA should have the
tools to address the problems arising from improper disposal of toxic waste, and 2) re-
sponsible parties should bear the costs of clean-up of hazardous waste sites where a
threat exists. Id. at 1112. Thus, the court found that "to give effect to these congres-
sional concerns, CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction .. ," and
should not be interpreted to limit the liability of those responsible for clean-up costs.
Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 3.
27, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982) provides:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat
of such release into the environment or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may produce
1988)
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mental trust29 established to enable immediate cleanup.30 Section
107(a)31 of CERCLA creates a federal cause of action32 against any
"person" who arranges for the disposal, treatment, or transfer of toxic
waste. Section 107(a)(1)3 3 of the Act extends liability to "owners and
operators" of waste facilities. 34 These provisions allow the government
to recoup funds expended for cleanup. 35 Although the Act clearly con-
templates that corporations are "persons,"'36 neither the Act nor its
legislative history clearly imposes liability on corporate officers and
owners acting within the scope of their employment.37
In 1984, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri decided Northeastern Pharmaceutical31 With regard to the
individual liability of Lee, the corporation's vice-president, under
CERCLA, the court recognized that a corporate officer is generally not
an imminent or substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is
authorized to act.., to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for
remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at
any time ....
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982) provides:
(a) For the purposes of this section there is authorized to be appropriated from the
Hazardous Substance Superfund established under Subchapter A of Chapter 98 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 not more than $8,500,000,000 .... (c) Uses of
the Fund under subsection (a) of this section include-3)... the costs of a pro-
gram to identify, investigate, and take enforcement and abatement action against
releases of hazardous substances.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982).
30. CERCLA Report, supra note 1, at 6136.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 3 for pertinent text.
32. See CERCLA Report, note 1, at 6136.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 3 for pertinent text.
34. See infra note 42 for CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator."
35. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,
749 (8th Cir. 1987), noting that CERCLA recovery suits are equitable actions for reim-
bursement or restitution of funds expended.
36. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 163, 186, 187 (W.D.
Mo. 1985); see also Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 742.
37. The notion of imposing liability on a corporation for the acts of its officers is
essentially an application of the traditional rule of respondeat superior, or vicarious lia-
bility. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978). Hence, a critical
question arises concerning whether an officer acted within the scope of his or her em-
ployment. This issue is, however, beyond the scope of this comment. See generally H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 230 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing
officer liability for corporate debts).
38. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984).
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accountable for the acts of the corporation.39 The court noted, how-
ever, that CERCLA liability does not distinguish between individual
and corporate entities.'" Lee, a "person" who arranged for the trans-
port of hazardous substances, was thus individually liable under sec-
tion 107(a)(3)." Because Lee was a NEPACCO stockholder, he was
also liable as an "owner or operator"42 under section 107(a)(1). 43
Thus, the court supplied two grounds for holding corporate officers
and owners individually liable for response costs under CERCLA. The
court implicitly approved of the corporate actor liability rule in the
CERCLA liability provisions.4'
Shortly after the Northeastern Pharmaceutical district court deci-
sion, the United States District Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire decided United States v. Mottolo.45 The president and principal
39. Id at 847. The assertion of corporate capacity as a defense to personal liability
may invoke the "business judgement rule." This rule is
[a] corollary of the usual statutory provisions that it is the directors who shall
manage the corporation. The rule is simply that business judgement of the direc-
tors will not be challenged or overturned by the courts or shareholders and the
directors will not be held liable for their exercise of business judgement... even for
judgements that appear to have been clear mistakes.
R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986). The rule immunizes directors who act in
concert as a board. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Because
there was no evidence that the decision to bury the waste arose from a formal meeting
of NEPACCO's board, the business judgment rule does not apply. Even if the board
did decide to bury the waste, this fact would not necessarily excuse Lee's actions be-
cause his liability springs from participation as an actor in the disposal. See Donsco, 587
F.2d at 606.
40. See supra note 3 for CERCLA definition of "person."
41. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 847, 848.
42. Id at 849. CERCLA defines "owner and operator": "in the case of an onshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility .... Such term does not include a
person, who, without participating in the management of [such] ... facility, holds indi-
cia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the.., facility." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
CERCLA defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im-
poundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or air-
craft or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stores, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise... located ....
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. IV 1986).
43. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 848. See supra note 3 for liability
provisions.
44. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49. See supra notes 40-43.
45. 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984).
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shareholder of a small chemical firm authorized the removal of several
drums containing toxic wastes.' Like Lee, the defendant president in
Mottolo asserted corporate capacity as a defense to personal liability.47
Due to his extensive personal involvement with the company, the court
denied the president's defense of corporate capacity to personal liabil-
ity.4 The court imposed individual liability on the president because
he was a "person," as defined by CERCLA, who arranged for the dis-
posal of hazardous waste.49 The court justified its holding by citing a
First Circuit5" case that imposed the corporate actor liability rule.
In United States v. Carolawn Co.,51 the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina held three men liable as "owners"5 2
of a waste dump under section 107(a)(1). 3 Interpreting CERCLA lit-
erally, the court noted the extensive use of personal pronouns in the
Act's definitional language.54 Drawing from the district court decision
in Northeastern Pharmaceutical to support its analysis, the Carolawn
court concluded that use of the corporate form failed to preclude the
individual liability of corporate officers and shareholders under
CERCLA.55
46. The chemical firm, Lewis Chemical Company, set up its operations in an old
leather processing plant. After moving in, the company cleaned up bits of leftover
leather and latex. After defendant Mottolo's company unclogged a drain at the Lewis
plant, Mottolo offered to carry away the remnants of leather and latex. The president of
Lewis agreed. However, the rubbish was contaminated with various toxic substances, a
fact unknown to either party. Id. at 58, 59.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 59, 60. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982); see supra note 3 for text.
50. Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (lst Cir. 1980).
In Escude Cruz an employer of a Puerto Rican corporation sued his employer for failing
to warn him of the dangerous chemicals to which he was allegedly exposed. To hold the
corporate officer of the employer corporation liable, the court found that if the officer
"directs or participates actively in the commission of a tortious act," he could be per-
sonally liable. Id at 907.
51. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (LD.S.C. 1984).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); see note 42 for definitions of "owner"
and "operator." The three individual defendants in the action purchased and received
the property involved prior to incorporation of their enterprise. Later, the same three
were the principal owners and operators of the defendant waste disposal company.
Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,699.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 3 for text.
54. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,700.
55. I
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/18
OFFICER AND SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 5 6 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit similarly found a corporate actor liable for
dumping hazardous waste. The court construed the "owner and oper-
ator ' v57 provision of CERCLA as excluding from liability those indi-
viduals who hold "indicia of ownership" 58 but do not participate in the
firm's management. The court thus implied that individuals with "in-
dicia of ownership" would be liable under CERCLA if they participate
in their firm's management.5 9 Therefore, Section 107(a) eliminated the
need to "pierce the corporate veil" to attach liability to corporate
owners.
60
Moreover, in United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.,61 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri rein-
forced the holdings in Mottolo,62 Carolawn,6 3 Shore Realty," and
Northeastern Pharmaceutical6 The court recognized the corporate
actor rule of individual liability for corporate torts when the individual
personally participated in the harm.66 The Special Master67 refused to
grant the government summary judgment against Conservation Chem-
56. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). In Shore Realty the State of New York sued the
corporation and Donald LeoGrande, its officer and stockholder, to clean up a hazard-
ous waste disposal site. The corporation acquired the site from the state for land devel-
opment purposes. Although neither LeoGrande nor Shore participated in generating
the waste, LeoGrande knew that over 700,000 gallons of hazardous waste were stored
on the premises. 759 F.2d at 1038-39.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 42.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). See also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at
1052.
59. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052.
60. Id.
61. 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). In Conservation Chemical, a Kansas City
corporation stored, treated, and disposed of numerous varieties of chemical wastes in six
soil basins. 619 F. Supp. at 182.
62. United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984).
63. United States v. Carolawn, Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699
(D.S.C. 1984).
64. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
65. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984). The District Court for the Western District of Missouri thus decided
both NEPACCO and Conservation Chemical.
66. Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 189, 190.
67. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 53 the court appointed a Special Master to make
initial conclusions of law. On all points relevant to the rule of direct officer liability
under CERCLA, the district court adopted the Special Master's initial conclusions of
law. IcL at 175.
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ical's president, majority shareholder, and "sole technical person" '68 be-
cause the existing record was inadequate to establish the officer's
liability without a trial on the merits.69 Nonetheless, the officer stood
subject to potential CERCLA liability due to his dominance of Conser-
vation Chemical's affairs.7
By the time the Eighth Circuit delivered its opinion in Northeastern
Pharmaceutical,71 courts across the country had implemented the dis-
trict court's rule of individual actor liability under CERCLA.72 The
circuit court decision reiterated the two major propositions of the dis-
trict court's holding. First, the term "person," as employed by CER-
CLA, encompasses both individual and corporate entities. 3 Second,
an individual's status as a corporate shareholder or officer is entirely
immaterial to determining individual liability.7' Liability is personal
and not derivative through the corporation.
The Eighth Circuit commented on the implications of strict7" officer
liability. First, the court noted that the corporate actor liability rule
eliminates the need to "pierce the corporate veil,",76 a traditional means
of accomplishing shareholder liability. The court implied that its
broad reading of CERCLA's liability provisions would ease the gov-
ernment's task of recovering response costs77 from individuals by re-
moving the need to prove that the corporation is "less than a bona fide
entity.",78 In addition, the court expressly held that the corporate actor
rule underlies section 107(a) liability.79 This holding firmly grounds
68. Id. at 190. One person, Hjersted, occupied all three roles. Id.
69. Id. The question of Hjersted's liability centered on a question of the nature and
degree of his participation in the dumping. Id. Hjersted "vigorously opposed the impo-
sition of personal liability." Id. Recognizing the "caution" a court must exercise in
ruling on summary judgment motions, the court deferred the question to trial. Id.
70. Id
71. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986).
72. See supra notes 24, 44, 49, 55, 56, 66 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 744.
74. Id.
75. CERCLA imposes a standard of strict liability under its liability provisions.
Thus, the EPA need not produce evidence of negligence or misfeasance to demonstrate
liability. CERCLA Report, supra note 1, at 6136.
76. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744.
77. See CERCLA Report, supra note 1, at 6136.
78. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744. The court thus followed the
Third Circuit's holding in Donsco, 759 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1978).
79. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744.
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the rule in strict tort liability terms rather than the more complicated
rules of corporate law. Together with the Second Circuit's opinion in
Shore Realty,80 the Northeastern Pharmaceutical decision represents a
potent precedent for plaintiffs in pending and future CERCLA
litigation. 1
The line of decisions culminating in Northeastern Pharmaceutical82
exhibits the highest judicial regard for Congress' intent to remedy the
troublesome toxic waste situation. Apparently, the courts find the po-
tential consequences of delayed toxic waste cleanup so pernicious that
very little should impede the EPA in its response efforts. Certainly, the
facts regarding the serious health consequences of improper toxic waste
disposal support this motivation by emphasizing the urgency of the sit-
uation. However, notably absent from the court's discussion of section
107(a) 3 liability of corporate owners and officers is the impact of such
potential liability on the chemical and waste management industries.
Response costs frequently reach millions of dollars, 4 sums startling
to corporations and investors involved in the chemical and waste man-
agement industries.8 5 Interestingly, no court has fully weighed the im-
80. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1978). See supra notes
56-66 and accompanying text.
81. The balance of the Northeastern Pharmaceutical decision includes several hold-
ings with broad implications for pending and future CERCLA litigation. These hold-
ings invariably favor the government in its restitution efforts. First, CERCLA liability
applies retroactively to include pre-enactment dumping sites. United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). Sec-
ondly, the government can recover its pre-enactment response costs under CERCLA.
Id at 737. Third, the court held that NEPACCO, a Delaware corporation which al-
lowed its charter to lapse for failure to appoint an agent for service of process, was in a
"suspended state from which it may be revived at any time." Id at 746. Thus, because
NEPACCO failed to file the formal voluntary dissolution papers with the Delaware
Secretary of State, it was still viable as an entity and therefore subject to suit. Id. at 747.
Fourth, the decision confirmed that the defendant has the burden of proof to demon-
strate any irregularities in the government's response strategy and expenditures. Id, at
748. Finally, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that CERCLA re-
sponse efforts for restitution and reimbursement are equitable in nature. Despite the
defendants' argument that the remedy is statutory, and therefore legal, the Eighth Cir-
cuit kept intact the trial court's denial of a jury trial. Id, at 749.
82. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1987).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
84. See United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Ark. 1987)
(response costs totalling a minimum estimate of $52.2 million for treatment of dioxin
facility).
85. See Note, CERCLA Defendants: The Problem of Expanding Liability and Di-
minishing Defenses, 31 WASH. U.J. URs. & CONTEMP. L. 289, 315-16 (noting that ex-
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pact of shareholder liability for toxic cleanup on investment, research,
and development within the industries. Only Shore Realty suggested
that "abatement expenses may become prohibitive and disproportion-
ate."8 6 The proposition that toxic waste poses a serious threat to our
nation's environmental well-being is at least as true as the proposition
that the chemical and waste management industries perform useful so-
cial functions. Although the threat posed to our society and environ-
ment may eventually attain overriding precedence, a prudent and
careful balancing of these differing interests is necessary.
The Northeastern Pharmaceutical decision evinces a judicial desire to
accord the highest priority to the congressional goal of cleaning up the
threat posed by inactive and abandoned toxic waste dumps. Though
the problem may fully warrant such sanctions as personal shareholder
and officer liability for response costs, Congress and the courts should
consider the implications such liability may have upon affected parties.
Robert S. Guenther
pansive CERCLA liability may produce a chilling effect on transactions within the
chemical and waste industries).
86. New York v. Shore Realty, 795 F.2d 1032, 1053 (2d Cir. 1985). The court in
United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 187 (W.D. Mo. 1985),
echoed this same observation. Although these sentiments reflect some concern for the
impact of potentially staggering CERCLA liability on smaller firms and their investors,
the notion is still quite removed from exerting itself as a mature judicial standard.
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